Denver Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 3

Article 1

January 1954

Improving Legal Procedure for Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill
Henry Wiehofen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Henry Wiehofen, Improving Legal Procedure for Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 31 Dicta 81 (1954).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Mar., 1954

DICTA

IMPROVING LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR
HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL
HENRY WIEHOFEN*
Proffe.-sor, 7ni ersity of Neiw Mexico, School of fmw

It is a very good and very hopeful thing that a meeting such
as this should be taking place-a meeting attended by the officers
and committee chairmen of the legal and medical professional organizations, as well as members of the legislature and civic leaders
interested in medical-legal problems. I am very flattered to be
permitted to participate.
This kind of meeting is so very important because doctors and
lawyers usually find it difficult to get together, not only literally
around a luncheon table, but also in their thinking about problems
they are forced to share. Their training and methodology differs
so much that they have difficulty in understanding each other's
viewpoints . . . and also that of other groups, social workers and
volunteers.
The lawyer is likely to regard the doctor as a man who knows
a lot about the human organism, but who is sadly unaware of the
complexities of social organization and who therefore is likely to
be naively impatient with the red tape and the delays that legal
and political action involves. The doctor is inclined to think of
the lawyer as too much absorbed in petty formalities and technicalities. Because the doctor has probably never had pointed out to
him the distinction between an advocate's function and a scientific
investigator's, he is likely to regard the lawyer's willingness to
take almost any kind of case as somewhat venal. That kind of
eyebrow raising is reciprocated by lawyers who have observed too
many medical experts displaying on the witness stand a conscious
or unconscious partisanship unbecoming representatives of the
scientific tradition. These lawyers may not stop to reflect that it
is the established legal procedure that forces expert testimony into
a partisan mold.
This lack of rapport is at least as apparent in the particular
medical-legal field I want to talk about today as in any other. The
subject I should like to discuss is the procedure by which persons
who are mentally ill are admitted to a mental hospital. The fundamental problem here is how to eliminate needless legalistic formality and at the same time maintain adequate legal safeguards
against error and abuse.
The impulse of the lawyer is to emphasize the need for adequate procedure to make sure that sane persons will not be "railroaded" into institutions. They therefore stress the importance of
a fair trial, with adequate personal notice, and a chance to be heard
*An ad(ress before the Colorado Mental Health Association, November 20,
193.
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and to confront the witnesses against one, before being deprived
of one's liberty. Medical men, on the other hand, are likely to
emphasize the harmful results of too much legal formality. They
advocate informal procedure designed to minimize the psychic
traumatization that a judicial trial frequently entails. They want
to eliminate the use of archaic legal phraseology carrying connotations of criminal prosecution and guilt, and set up methods that
encourage voluntary hospitalization and maximum patient participation. They urge that the patient should be recognized to have
not only legal rights, but also what we might call medical rights.
For example, the right to private confidences and sympathetic
handling. They condemn as a violation of this concept of "medical
due process" the public exposure by courts of a psychotic individual's behavior and his confidential communications, and the
public disclosure of the diagnosis and prognosis in the presence of
the patient.
The impatience of medical men with unduly formalized commitment procedures is understandable. But it's worth remembering that these procedures represent the application of principles
of fairness and justice in dealing with human rights that have
been established by generations who saw and suffered the effects
of more summary methods. It is a precious heritage that enables
us to insist that a man be served with notice of the pendency of
any legal action in which his rights may be affected, and that he
have opportunity to be present, to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, and to introduce any testimony he may
have in his own defense, instead of having his rights decided in
a secret star chamber proceeding and his life or liberty taken a
lettre de cachet calling for his confinement or liquidation without
notice or hearing. The terms "star chamber" and "lettre de cachet"
don't describe imaginary evils dreamed up by overcautious lawyers,
but real practices rampant not so many hundreds of years ago and
hardly exceeding practices current in various parts of the world
in our own time.
On the other hand, it is necessary for lawyers to recognize
that commitment to a mental institution involves peculiar considerations not present- in ordinary legal cases. A sane person can
usually be left to decide for himself whether he needs hospital
care for his physical ills. But a mentally ill person may not realize
that he is ill; more often than not, he will rationalize all his symptoms and explain the urgings of his family and physician as evidence of a gigantic plot against him. For the same reason that he
is incapable of reaching a decision to be hospitalized voluntarily,
legal safeguards such as notice and hearing may do him no good,
and he may only be harmed by them. The problem is to devise
procedures that will protect the sane without needlessly subjecting
the sick to heartless and harmful mental torture.
Present practices in many states are not only heartless and
harmful, but cumbersome and expensive as well, without having

Mar., 1954

DICTA

any demonstrable justification as safeguards against arbitrariness
or error.
You are interested specifically in the Colorado procedures.
It is, I feel, somewhat presumptuous for me to come here to tell
you about your law. But I think you prefer me to talk about Colorado law specifically, rather than to stick to safe generalities.
Perhaps you will let me talk as a member of the family. After all,
I lived in Colorado for nine years, teaching at the University of
Colorado, School of Law in Boulder. And I never had any intentions of leaving. In the fall of 1941, I left the state on what was
distinctly understood to be merely a one-year leave of absence, to
do some government work in Washington. I was prevented from
returning by the Japanese Government. It took me seven years
to get out of Washington and back to this part of the country. So
I hope I may be allowed to speak, if not as a Coloradoan, at least
as one whose Colorado citizenship was a war casualty.
Shortly before the war, while still at the University of Colorado, I wrote an article for the Rocky Mountain Law Review,
which that school publishes, entitled, "Commitment of Mental
Patients-Proposals to Eliminate Some Unhappy Features of Our
Legal Procedure." Not a very good title, but the article wasn't
as bad. In that article, I said the Colorado procedure was "cumbersome, expensive and heartless." I recently checked on the
statute to see to what extent it had been improved in the intervening years. I'm afraid that what I said then still holds true.
Colorado still retains the device of a county "lunacy commision" to determine whether a person should be ordered hospitalized.
There are only perhaps two or three other states still using this
device, e.g., Wyoming and Georgia.
I need hardly point out to you the quaint and utter obsoleteness of the word "lunacy" which the statute still retains. The word
harks back to the medieval belief that phases of the moon influenced diseases of the brain. Distempered persons were supposedly
"at the height of their distemper" in the full and change of the
moon, especially about the equinoxes and summer solstice; between
times, they ordinarily had "lucid intervals." Other states have
long ago discarded not only this word, but also other words having
criminal or other unfortunate connotations, like "complaint" "apprehension" and "commitment."
At the time the Colorado law was first adopted, that was the
accepted language for the purpose. The Colorado law-makers
weren't trying to stigmatize the unfortunate victim of mental disorder. But today, what effect do you think it has to describe the
proceeding as an "adjudication of lunacy," and the person as an
"adjudged lunatic?" Words are important. People who wouldn't
have any objection to being sent or having their relatives sent to
a mental hospital, are repulsed and even horrified at the idea of
being "adjudged a lunatic." Using this kind of terminology is a
wholly gratuitous outrage, which only leads people to shun as an
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unholy curse the healing and care that the State of Colorado offers
in its excellent hospitals.
When a lunacy complaint is filed, the Colorado statute provides it must be served on the person. I don't know whether some
of your back counties still entitle this document "Complaint in
Lunacy" in big black letters, but I know they used to. I need hardly
point out that if a person is somewhat unstable mentally, his condition is not going to be helped by being handed such a paper-by
a sheriff. In California, New York and a half dozen other states,
if the court, upon certificate of a physician or otherwise concludes
that service of notice on the patient would be harmful to him, the
judge can order it served on a next friend or relative, other than
the one who signed the application.
The sheriff, when he serves the complaint, must promptly "apprehend" the person and take him into custody. This provision
dates from older times, when the only persons recognized as needing confinement were those who were violent and dangerous. But
most of the people ordered into mental hospitals today are not raving maniacs who must promptly be handed over to the sheriff.
Why not eliminate the arrest except for those cases that actually
are violent or otherwise dangerous.
Some time after the arrest, the person is interviewed by the
physicians making up the lunacy commission and at a still later
time an informal hearing is held. At this hearing, two quite distinct questions are tried. The first is the person's mental condition.
The complaiJning witness and others are required to testify as to
the person's .mentalcondition. The patient must be present at the
first session and has the right to be present at all. Needless to say,
it is likely to be a distressing and even tragic ordeal to the patient
and to his family for them to have to testify to his condition and
all the irrational acts. A good many of the mentally ill, especially
the paranoid types, already feel that people dislike them and are
persecuting them and for good reason. Requiring them to sit in a
courtroom and listen to their trusted physician and nearest and
dearest relatives testify to the facts regarding their mental condition is likely to cofifirm their worst suspicions. The result may be
dangerous to the dthers as well as harmful to the patient's self
preservation. Other states, including our neighboring Utah, have
long since given the judge discretion to waive the requirement of
the patient's presence where it might be detrimental.
The other question that this commission of doctors must decide
is whether he owns any property, so that he is able to pay for the
cost of his care in the hospital himself. Why this should be put to
a commission of doctors I can't see. The sensible way would be to
have that question determined administratively, rather than by a
trial. That would not only be simpler, but you would be much more
likely to get the truth, and the money, by hiring a couple of investigators than using doctors sitting in a hearing. Most other states
do it that way; why not Colorado.
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If the commission reports that the person is insane or distracted so as to endanger his own or another's life or property, it
is the duty of the court to order commitment. But if the patient
or someone in his behalf is dissatisfied with the commitment order,
he may demand a trial before a jury of six.
Most states have abolished jury trials in commitment cases.
The objections to jury trials are several:
1. The traumatic effects on the patient are serious. As Dr.
Manfred Cuttmacher and I said in a recent book, "There is hardly
a more powerful device conceivable for convincing a person with
delusions of persecution that his suspicions are true than subjecting
him to a jury trial."
2. The reluctance of relatives to expose before a jury what
they regard as the shame and disgrace of having "insanity" in the
family, and to testify against their own kin in such a public performance, cause many relatives to postpone taking this step until
the condition has become hopeless. The result is that the state has
to support perhaps for a long lifetime, someone whom it could have
cured in a year or two, if treatment had started early enough.
People have spent their life savings to get private care rather than
suffer the ordeal and the publicity of court commitment proceedings.
3. A jury of laymen is obviously not well qualified to pass on
a question calling for a highly specialized medical diagnosis. There
is even statistical evidence that juries make more mistakes than
judges or medical commissions. And I don't suppose there is any
reason to be surprised at that. The person who is most likely to
demand a jury is the mentally ill person with a persecution complex. And if he is articulate and quick-witted, as such types very
frequently are, he may convince a jury that his story of a nefarious
plot to railroad him is true. Persons unskilled in psychiatry are
likely not to realize that even a seriously mentally disordered person
does not exhibit his symptoms all the time. Especially on such a
special occasion as a trial, he may be able to cover up temporarily
his abnormal ideas and attitudes, and appear quite normal. Only
the phychiatrist who has observed him over a period of time may
realize that he has all the characteristic symptoms of a major
phychosis.
WHETHER INSTITUTION IS REQUIRED TO ADMIT

Miss Woodhouse has called my attention to the recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court holding that the superintendant of the State Home at Ridge is not required to accept
mental defectives ordered committed to that institution by the
court, if there is no room in the institution.
This is a problem that plagues many states. The institution
is overcrowded; should the courts be allowed to continue to commit
persons without regard to whether there is room available. Or,
on the other hand, should persons who the courts have found need
institutional care be denied it. In New Mexico, our legislature
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has given two different answers. The state hospital is required
to accept all commitments; the state school for mental defectives
is not. The result is bad in each case. The hospital is overcrowded,
and the staff has no power to object, no matter how many new
cases are sent to it. On the other hand, the state school has a filing
cabinet full of applications which it is unable to accept because it
is full.
The right answer of course is to build more hospitals. But
there are always competing uses for the state's money, and the
mental patients are not the most powerful lobby working on the
legislature. So in the meantime we have to meet the problems that
the shortage causes.
In Massachusetts, my friend Dr. Winfred Overholser, superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, tells me, they
have an informal arrangement by which the judges do not commit
to the state school unless the school can assure the judge that the
child can be received, Something of the sort also operates in the
District of Columbia. While the situation is deplorable for children
who cannot be sent to the state school because there is no room,
yet the courts could jam the place hopelessly if the institution did
not have power to prevent it.
COMMITMENT OF NON-RESIDENTS

I have more doubt about the soundness of another Colorado
decision, Kendall v. People, in which the court held that the courts
in Denver County did not have jurisdiction to commit a person
whose residence is in another county-even if the court of the
home county consented. The problem arises this way: A person
whose home is on the western slope, let us say, is suspected by his
family or others of being mentally disordered. They obtain his
admission to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital, or to the Veterans
Hospital, or some other institution or clinic in Denver, for examination and observation. It appears that he should be hospitalized.
It seems an outrageous imposition on the patient to have to transport him all the way back home, have a commitment hearing in his
home county, and then bring him back to Denver or to Pueblo.
To avoid this useless expense and trouble, it has apparently
been the practice in some cases to obtain the consent of the court
in the home county to permit the Denver court to conduct the commitment proceedings. This practice now has apparently been held
invalid by the State Supreme Court.
This seems to me unfortunate. It is true, as the Supreme Court
says, that loose procedure may lead to abuse. There was a case
some years ago that illustrates this. It was not a Colorado case.
It involved a Wichita, Kansas, dentist. His brother, Bernard, who
lived in Missouri, decided that the dentist was losing his mind.
He arranged for them to drive to Indiana together. While driving
through his home town in Howard County, Missouri, Bernard asked
his brother to stop at the courthouse, where he had some business
to attend to. The dentist- waited downstairs, while Bernard trans-
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acted his business, which turned out to be the filing of an information alleging that the dentist was insane. A notice was prepared
on the spot by the obliging judge, setting a date for a hearing. A
deputy sheriff thereupon arrested the dentist as he stood on the
street waiting for his brother to return. He was taken to jail anl
from there to a hospital. Although the notice has stated that he
was entitled to be present at the hearing, and to be represented by
counsel, the asylum to which he had been sent had a rule that
inmates could not be released for that purpose, and so he was found
insane without his being present. His brother Bernard was appointed guardian. Bernard then proceeded to get court permission
to sell and otherwise control the dentist's property. It took some
time for news of the dentist's incarceration to reach friends, who
retained counsel for him. It took a habeas corpus proceeding in
the federal court to obtain his release. The federal court held that
his commitment and confinement were all illegal, because he was
not even a resident of Howard County, or even of the state of
Missouri.
The Colorado court is therefore quite right in being careful
about permitting people to be ordered committed elsewhere than
in their home county. Nevertheless, I think proper safeguards
could be devised and insisted on, and the practice permitted with
such safeguards. The safeguards should be:
1. That the court of the county of residence give its consent;
2. That the court agrees that the county of residence will bear
the expense; and
3. That investigation of whether the person owns property in
the county of residence has been determined or will be determined by the court of that county.
I even venture to suggest that the Kendall case may not foreclose this result. That case may perhaps be distinguished, and the
court induced to limit it to its own facts. Those facts present several other reasons for the holding. Thus, the complaint alleged
that the patient was "a resident of the county jail in the City and
County of Denver." The commission report was confusing in that
it answered all three of the statutory questions regarding mental
conditions in the affirmative. The commission and the committing
court had also ignored the fact that the patient owned property in
Montezuma County, and reported that "said person has no estate
out of which his care and maintenance can be made." If in a new
case these objections or errors are not present, and a strong argument is presented to the court, pointing up that it is both humane
and economical to permit the practice-with adequate safeguardsthere is a chance that the court might be willing to re-examine
the question. It is quite clear in my own mind that the statute
itself does not forbid the practice. On the contrary, it clearly indicates that the court of a county may have jurisdiction to commit
at person who is "found" in that county, even though he may be
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a non-resident of the county, and even though he may be a nonresident of the state.
I shall not presume to t2ll you what you ought to do about
improving the Colorado law. Instead, let me tell you what we did
in New Mexico.
Our law was definitely worse than Colorado's. It provided
for a "charge" being filed against a person alleged to be insane.
A peace officer was thereupon ordered to "apprehend and detain"
him under a "warrant of apprehension." The "defendant," as he
was called, was thereupon "arraigned" before a judge, who was
required to "inform him that he is charged with being insane" and
to "inform him of his rights to make a defense to such charge."
He wasn't required to plead guilty or not guilty, but the connotation of a criminal accusation was certainly there.
We succeeded in having that law repealed this year, and a
model law substituted. And by we, I mean a group just like this.
namely, the New Mexico Conference on Social Welfare and the
Mental Hygiene Society in Albuquerque. Actually, the bill was
pushed through by a handful of individuals.
Remember that this isn't a controversial issue, in the political
sense. It doesn't require any new tax or any appropriation. There
is no pressure group whom it would hurt and who will oppose it.
You can get it considered strictly on the merits. We found that it
is not too difficult to convince a few key members of the House
and Senate committees that the bill will improve the existing procedure. I understand you tried to amend your statute.
Nor do you have to start from scratch to draft a wholly new
act. A committee of psychiatrists and lawyers working under the
auspicesxbf the National Institute of Mental Health has drafted a
model act for the hospitalization of the mentally ill. This draft
represents the most modern thinking on the subject, translated
into concrete legal procedures. You can simply have the legislature adopt this model, with such slight adaptations as local law
might require. That is what we did in New Mexico.
This act permits hospitalization in the great majority of cases
without judicial proceedings. A person can be admitted upon application by someone on his behalf, plus certification by two "designated examiners" (that is, physicians registered as specially qualified under standards to be set up by a state agency such as a board
of health).
A judicial hearing is required only for compulsory hospitalization of someone who refuses to go peacefully where there is no
emergency and no danger of injury. The act also provides for
emergency admission, and for voluntary hospitalization.
It also has a novel "bill of rights" for patients, including not
only general rights such as the right to "humane care and treatment," and to the highest standards of medical care possible with
the facilities and personnel available, but also the right to communicate by sealed mail, to receive visitors and to exercise civil
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rights, including the right to dispose of property, make contracts
and to vote, except insofar as one may have been declared incompetent to exercise such rights. Mechanical restraints are not to be
applied except where found necessary by the head of the institution,
and every use of such a restraint and the reasons therefor is to be
part of the clinical record of the patient.
This model act offers an immense improvement over older
legal procedures. It is ingeniously devised to allow voluintary or
involuntary hospitalization without needless red tape, and yet to
provide the fullest kind of judicial hearing in any case where the
person wants it.
I have mentioned the importance of early treatment. Even
more important is prevention. One of the most useful functions an
organization like this can serve is educating the public in what we
ought to know about mental illness, its causes and how to prevent
or cure it. Reforming the commitment law is a specific objective,
which it is to be hoped won't take you too long and which when
achieved, won't have to be done again for a while.
But educating parents, teachers and others in what we should
know about human personality is an unending job. Especially
3 truths, it is important to get over:
1. Mental disorder is caused.
2. The causes of most mental disorders start much farther
back in early childhood, in infancy, than we formerly
realized.
Wrongdoers-Can usually find were symptoms a long time.
Gluecks' 500-Over half had manifested significant signs
of anti-social behavior before they were 8. 9/10 before 11.
Causes-Insecurity, or uncertainty in love and affection.
Overstrict, domineering parents-or overindulgent.
3. Most can be cured if caught early enough, as T. B. and
cancer. That's why it is important to have procedure to
encourage that. Save these long expensive custodial commitments. Teach parents and teachers to spot the overaggresive or the too passive child.
Of course, to provide the individual with all the favorable
factors for healthy personality development, to allow him to realize
and express his own personality, we'd pretty much have to rebuild
the world. And create a world that satisfies the individual's need
for economic security, for affection, for status, prestige and group
identification-a world stable enough to afford a feeling of security
and yet flexible enough to adapt itself to change.

